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STATEMENT REGARDING JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78A-4-103(2)(j). The appeal was taken from an order of the district court over 
which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction, but the 
Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to the Utah Court of Appeals by Order 
filed December 3, 2010. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the district court erred in dismissing Mr. Anderson's claim 
for Breach of Contract as a matter of law? 
Defendants/Appellees argued in their Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment that Mr. Anderson's Breach of Contract claim should be 
denied because Mr. Anderson signed "at-will and contract disclaimer documents;" 
Mr. Paynter, with whom Mr. Anderson alleges he contracted, "had no authority to 
bind the company;" and any contract had to be in writing and signed by all parties. 
R. 65-69.l Mr. Anderson argued in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment that whether Mr. Paynter had 
authority to contract and whether the employment agreement he seeks to enforce is 
Cites to page numbers in the record in this brief are designated by "R. page number." 
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a contract are both questions of fact. R. 168-174. The district court dismissed Mr. 
Anderson's Breach of Contract claim, along with his other three claims, on 
summary judgment. R. 243-245. Mr. Anderson preserved his Breach of Contract 
claim for appeal through his Notice of Appeal, which states, "The appeal is taken 
from the entire judgment." R. 249. 
This court reviews "'a district court's decision to grant summary judgment 
for correctness,' giving no deference to the court below." Giusti v. Wentworth, 
2009 UT 2, \ 19 (Utah 2009). Further, in order to prevail at summary judgment, it 
is a movant's burden to "affirmatively provide factual evidence establishing that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact." Orvis v. Johnson, 111 P. 3d 600, 604 
(Utah 2008). 
2. Whether the trial court erred in dismissing Mr. Anderson's claim for 
Promissory Estoppel as a matter of law? 
Defendants/Appellees argued in their Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment that Mr. Anderson's Promissory Estoppel claim failed 
because based upon the disclaimer Mr. Anderson signed, the company could not be 
bound by Mr. Paynter's representations to him, and he could not have reasonably 
relied upon Mr. Paynter's representations. R. 69. Mr. Anderson responded that 
whether Mr. Paynter had authority to contract for the company was a question of 
fact. R. 168-172. The district court dismissed Mr. Anderson's Promissory 
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Estoppel Claim, along with his other three claims, on summary judgment. R. 243-
245. Mr. Anderson preserved his Promissory Estoppel claim for appeal through 
his Notice of Appeal, which states, "The appeal is taken from the entire judgment." 
R. 249. 
This court reviews "'a district court's decision to grant summary judgment 
for correctness,' giving no deference to the court below." Giusti v. Wentworth, 
2009 UT 2, f 19 (Utah 2009). Further, in order to prevail at summary judgment, it 
is a movant's burden to "affirmatively provide factual evidence establishing that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact." Orvis v. Johnson, 111 P. 3d 600, 604 
(Utah 2008). 
3. Whether the trial court erred in dismissing Mr. Anderson's 
claim for Fraud as a matter of law? 
Defendants/Appellees argued in their Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment that Mr. Anderson's Fraud claim failed because the 
company did not make any of the representations Mr. Anderson alleged to him, 
and based on the disclaimer Mr. Anderson signed, he did not reasonably rely on 
any representations by Mr. Paynter. R. 71-72. Mr. Anderson responded that 
whether Mr. Paynter had authority to contract for the company (and thus, whether 
Mr. Anderson's reliance on his representations was reasonable) was a question of 
fact. R. 168-172. The district court dismissed Mr. Anderson's Fraud claim, along 
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with his other three claims, on summary judgment. R. 243-245. Mr. Anderson 
preserved his Fraud claim for appeal through his Notice of Appeal, which states, 
"The appeal is taken from the entire judgment." R. 249. 
This court reviews "'a district court's decision to grant summary judgment 
for correctness/ giving no deference to the court below." Giusti v. Wentworth, 
2009 UT 2, f 19 (Utah 2009). Further, in order to prevail at summary judgment, it 
is a movant's burden to "affirmatively provide factual evidence establishing that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact." Orvis v. Johnson, 111 P. 3d 600, 604 
(Utah 2008). 
4. Whether the trial court erred in dismissing Mr. Anderson's 
claim for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing as 
a matter of law? 
Defendants/Appellees argued in their Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment that Mr. Anderson's claim for Breach of the Implied 
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing fails because "there was no such contract 
in the first place." R. 72-73. Mr. Anderson responded that the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing exists "independent of the express terms of any contract 
between the parties." R. 174. The trial court dismissed Mr. Anderson's claim for 
Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, along with his other three 
claims, on summary judgment. R. 243-245. Mr. Anderson preserved this claim for 
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appeal through his Notice of Appeal, which states, "The appeal is taken from the 
entire judgment." R. 249. 
This court reviews "'a district court's decision to grant summary judgment 
for correctness,' giving no deference to the court below." Giusti v. Wentworth, 
2009 UT 2, f 19 (Utah 2009). Further, in order to prevail at summary judgment, it 
is a movant's burden to "affirmatively provide factual evidence establishing that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact." Orvis v. Johnson, 111 P. 3d 600, 604 
(Utah 2008). 
5. Whether the trial court erred in dismissing all Mr. Anderson's claims 
because the court found that the agent he negotiated his employment agreement 
with did not have actual authority to contract on behalf of the company? 
Effectively, Defendants/Appellees argued in their Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment that the viability of all of Mr. Anderson's claims 
hinged on whether Mr. Paynter had authority to contract with him or whether he 
had a reasonable belief that Mr. Paynter had such authority. R. 75-73. In 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Mr. Anderson argued that whether Mr. Paynter had the authority to 
contract with him is a question of fact. R. 168-172. The trial court found that 
"only Larry H. Miller had the authority to bind" the company, and that Mr. Paynter 
did not have such authority. The court relied upon these findings to dismiss all of 
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Mr. Anderson's claims. R. 244-245. Mr. Anderson preserved his challenge to this 
finding for appeal through his Notice of Appeal, which states, "The appeal is taken 
from the entire judgment." R. 249. 
This court reviews "'a district court's decision to grant summary judgment 
for correctness,' giving no deference to the court below." Giusti v. Wentworth, 
2009 UT 2, <J[ 19 (Utah 2009). Further, in order to prevail at summary judgment, it 
is a movant's burden to "affirmatively provide factual evidence establishing that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact." Orvis v. Johnson, 111 P. 3d 600, 604 
(Utah 2008). 
6. Whether the trial court erred in not holding a hearing on Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment? 
In Defendants' Request to Submit Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment for Decision, Defendants included a request for a hearing. R. 236. 
Defendants' request was not specifically denied, but the court issued its decision in 
this matter without holding a hearing. R. 239-242. Mr. Anderson preserved his 
challenge to this finding for appeal through his Notice of Appeal, which states, 
"The appeal is taken from the entire judgment." R. 249. 
A court's grant of summary judgment without a hearing is "is reviewed for 
correctness." Price v. Amour, 949 P.2d 1251 (Utah 1997). 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATUTES DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL 
Not applicable. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a decision of the Utah Third District Court, which 
granted summary judgment for Defendants/Appellees, thereby dismissing each of 
the four claims brought by Appellant Steven Anderson's ("Mr. Anderson"). 
Mr. Anderson sued for Breach of Contract, Promissory Estoppel, Fraud, and 
Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, based upon the following 
facts: In the summer of 2007, Mr. Anderson was preparing to begin his 29th year 
as a high school drama teacher. He was two years from retiring with a full pension 
from Davis County School District. Mr. Anderson occasionally did some acting 
and other work on movies and television shows. In 2007, he had volunteered on a 
show produced by Defendant/Appellee Larry H. Miller Communications 
Corporation ("LHMCC")- Through his work on that show, he met 
Defendant/Appellee Dean Paynter ("Mr. Paynter"), who was in charge of 
production for LHMCC. During the summer of 2007, Mr. Paynter encouraged Mr. 
Anderson to audition to anchor a new show that LHMCC was starting called KJZZ 
Cafe. Mr. Anderson was hesitant because he was so close to retirement with the 
school district, but Mr. Paynter promised Mr. Anderson that if he came to work for 
LHMCC as an anchor for KJZZ Cafe, he would be guaranteed a salary from 
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LHMCC for three years, regardless of what happened to the show. LHMCC 
offered Mr. Anderson one of the three anchor positions for KJZZ Cafe, which was 
to begin filming in early 2008. Mr. Anderson began practicing with the other 
anchors for the show in the fall of 2007. When school began that fall, however, he 
went back to his full-time teaching schedule. Mr. Anderson could not teach full-
time and film the show. He informed Mr. Paynter that he would not give up his 
full-time schedule unless he had a guaranteed contract. Mr. Paynter finally 
provided Mr. Anderson with a written contract in early January 2008, just a few 
days before the show was to begin filming, and a week or two before Mr. 
Anderson was to start teaching winter semester at his school. At that point, Mr. 
Anderson informed the administration at his school that he would start teaching 
part-time the next semester. He began filming KJZZ Cafe in January 2008, and 
continued to work for the show until November 2008, when it was cancelled. 
After the show was cancelled, however, LHMCC refused to pay Mr. Anderson for 
the remaining two years of salary that it had promised him. 
After discovery in this case, Defendants/Appellees filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment, which the district court granted without holding a hearing. 
The district court filed a Minute Entry in which it dismissed Mr. Anderson's 
claims, and requested that the Defendants/Appellees draft an Order for the court to 
sign incorporating the reasons set forth in their Motion for Summary Judgment as 
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the basis for the court's ruling. Mr. Anderson hereby appeals the court's grant of 
Defendants'/Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following are the facts taken in the light most favorable to Mr. 
Anderson, as they must be at summary judgment: 
1. Steven Anderson has worked as a high school drama and English teacher 
since 1980. R. 198. In the summer of 2007, Mr. Anderson was preparing to begin 
his 29 year as a high school drama teacher for the Davis County School District. 
R. 199. He was two years from retiring with a full pension. R. 196, 199. 
2. Mr. Anderson occasionally did some work on television shows. In 2007, he 
worked on a show produced by Defendant LHMCC called "Be All Over." R. 196. 
3. Dean Paynter was the person who hired Mr. Anderson for "Be All Over." R. 
194. Mr. Anderson does not remember ever seeing Mr. Paynter's title, but from 
his perspective, Mr. Paynter was "the only one I saw that seemed to be in charge of 
anything." R. 194. 
4. In the summer of 2007, Mr. Paynter approached Mr. Anderson on the set of 
"Be All Over" and asked him to audition to be an new anchor person for a show 
called KJZZ Cafe. R. 85-86. 
5. There were to be three anchors for the show. R. 87. 
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6. Mr. Anderson was aware that LHMCC had "a habit of cancelling shows," 
and in fact, "Be All Over" was cancelled. R. 204. 
7. By going part-time in his teaching position in order to work for KJZZ, Mr. 
Anderson risked his retirement, because he had had to remain working for the 
school district for another two years to be able to retire, and yet if the show was 
canceled, he could not live off a part-time teaching salary, so he would have to 
look for a full-time position wherever he could find it. R. 195-196 
8. Mr. Anderson felt he could not "leave my teaching job for a job that is so 
precarious and fickle that no one knows what's going to happen to it." R. 204. 
9. Mr. Anderson auditioned for the anchor position. R. 86, 89. 
10. Nonetheless, he repeatedly told Mr. Paynter that he would not leave his full-
time teaching position without a contract from LHMCC. Mr. Anderson told Mr. 
Paynter several times, "I cannot work for KJZZ without a contract because shows 
can be canceled here and I'm not going to risk a high school career teaching 30 
years and the pension that will come because I could be forced to take a job 
someplace else and lose the 30, $35,000 that's part of it, even if I could get 30 
years in with someplace." R. 205. 
11. Mr. Paynter selected Mr. Anderson and two others to become the anchors 
for KJZZ Cafe. R. 87, 88. 
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12. In the summer of 2007, Mr. Anderson and the other two potential anchors 
began practicing for the show, but were not getting paid at that time. R. 91. 
13. In the fall of 2007, Mr. Anderson resumed his full-time teaching position at 
Viewmont High School. R. 92. 
14. Mr. Paynter was the direct supervisor for the anchors, and the person that 
met with each of them to offer them the job, and to discuss their salaries and 
benefits with them. R. 181-182; 188-189. 
15. Mr. Paynter verbally offered Mr. Anderson and the other anchors specific 
salary amounts, which differed for each anchor. R. 182,188. 
16. Mr. Payter understood that each anchor agreed to the salary amount he 
offered them when they began working on the show in November 2007. R. 188. 
17. Mr. Paynter acknowledges being aware that Mr. Anderson was expecting a 
contract of employment. R. 185. 
18. Mr. Paynter also acknowledges that the contract was to be for three years, 
and that he discussed this three-year contract with his supervisor, Chris Baum. R. 
178,184. 
19. When he started working for LHMCC in November 2007, Mr. Anderson 
went down to a secretary's office and signed some documents. R. 96. 
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20. On November 28, 2007, Mr. Anderson signed an Employment Application 
that stated, "MY EMPLOYMENT IS 'AT WILL' AND MAY BE 
TERMINATED, WITH OR WITHOUT CAUSE OR NOTICE, AT MY OPTION 
OR THE OPTION OF THE EMPLOYER." R. 117-118. 
21. Also on November 28, 2007, Mr. Anderson signed a form titled 
"Acknowledgment of Employee Handbook and 'At-Will' Employment" 
("Acknowledgement"). R. 120. This document stated that the Company's 
personnel policies are guidelines and not legally binding on my employer," and 
that his employment was "at will." It also stated, "I also understand and agree that 
no person other than Larry H. Miller has the authority to enter into any binding 
commitment or agreement to or with me, on behalf of the Company, and that any 
such commitment or agreement must be in writing and signed by all parties." R. 
120. 
22. Mr. Anderson understood that Larry H. Miller was the owner of LHMCC. 
R. 194. 
23. The handbook referred to in the Acknowledgement provided that, "No 
person other than the General Manager of your company has the authority to enter 
into any binding commitment or agreement concerning employment with the 
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company and any such commitment or agreement must be in writing and signed by 
the General Manager." R. 208 (and discussion at R. 164). 
24. Mr. Anderson made clear to Mr. Paynter many times that he would not leave 
his teaching position to work for the show without a contract. R. 197 (pp. 65-66); 
205 (p. 118:4-24). 
25. Mr. Paynter does not deny this, but states that he cannot recall whether Mr. 
Anderson made this demand. R. 186 (pp. 74:4-75:1). 
26. In late December 2007, Mr. Paynter contacted LHMCC s legal counsel 
about a contract for the anchors. R. 130. He received contract templates from 
LHMCC's legal counsel, who he understood gave him the responsibility of 
changing the contracts for each anchor to reflect their salaries, which he did. R. 
186-187 (pp. 77: 13-78:3). 
27. On or about January 4, 2008, Mr. Paynter presented Mr. Anderson with the 
Employment Agreement at issue in this case, which contained a salary guarantee 
for three years. R. 183-184; Employment Agreement at R. 137-144. Mr. Paynter 
acknowledges that he gave Mr. Anderson a contract that represented what LHMCC 
was prepared to offer him. R. 192. When Mr. Anderson did not get back to him 
with any changes, he understood that Mr. Anderson did not have any major 
objections to the contract. R. 192 (p. 107: 3-20). 
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28. The Employment Agreement listed Mr. Anderson's compensation for each 
of the next four years, with the last year qualified by the parenthetical "(LHMCC 
option)." R. 138. The Employment Agreement further provided, "If Anderson's 
services are terminated by LHMCC without Cause, Anderson shall be entitled to 
the average annual salary that would have been paid to Anderson over the entire 
remaining Term of this Agreement, or the remaining unearned salary hereunder, 
whichever is less." R. 140. The Agreement went on to state that if he were to be 
terminated, Mr. Anderson would have an obligation to mitigate his damages, and 
LHMCC would be entitled to an offset of its liability based on Mr. Anderson's 
earnings from subsequent employment. R. 140-141. 
29. Mr. Anderson started to sign the Employment Agreement, but Mr. Paynter 
stopped him "almost physically with a hand on the shoulder sort of thing." R. 206. 
Mr. Paynter told Mr. Anderson that "the lawyers said" the contract did not need to 
be signed in order to be enforceable. R. 110, 206. 
30. Mr. Paynter claims that the Employment Agreement was only a draft, but as 
stated above, he does not dispute that the terms in it represented his agreement with 
Mr. Anderson. He claims that the reason it was never finalized was due to the fact 
that the parties were busy: "my recollection is that we were in the heat of battle. . . 
. we were moving forward on the show .. we were more worried about what we 
were doing on the air than where the contracts were." R. 134-135. 
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31. Mr. Paynter testified in his deposition that based on his "general 
understanding of what contracts are," the agreement he presented to Mr. Anderson 
was not binding without being signed. R. 134. 
32. Mr. Anderson did not inform his school that he was going to begin teaching 
part-time the second semester of the 2007-2008 school year until after Mr. Paynter 
gave him a copy of the contract. R. 200, 204. 
33. KJZZ Cafe was cancelled in November 2008. R. 131-132. 
34. As a result of the show's cancellation, the employees who worked on the 
show were terminated, including Mr. Anderson. R. 133. Mr. Paynter personally 
terminated the anchors, including Mr. Anderson. R. 190-191. 
35. LHMCC did not pay Mr. Anderson after the show was cancelled. R. 198 (p. 
77:13-16). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Based upon the facts above, Mr. Anderson brought claims against LHMCC, 
Dean Paynter, and Chris Baum for Breach of Contract, Promissory Estoppel, 
Fraud, and Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 
Defendants/Appellees moved for summary judgment on all Mr. Anderson's 
claims. They argued that Mr. Paynter did not have authority to bind LHMCC 
because of the document Mr. Anderson signed stating that only Larry H. Miller 
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could bind the company, and that any such agreement must be in writing and 
signed by the parties. R. 66-67. The district court agreed with Defendants' 
reasoning and found that based upon the Acknowledgement, all of Mr. Anderson's 
claims should be dismissed. R. 241-245. 
The district court erred in finding the Acknowledgement dispositive of all 
Mr. Anderson's claims. The court failed to consider several facts that indicated 
that there were disputes of fact that were not appropriate for summary judgment. 
For instance, the Employment Agreement that Mr. Paynter provided Mr. Anderson 
(and his assurances that it did not have to be signed) superseded the document 
stating only Larry H. Miller could bind the company. Further, LHMCC's 
documents were conflicting on their face, considering the Acknowledgment stated 
that only Larry H. Miller could bind the company, but the company handbook 
stated that only the General Manager could bind the company. These conflicts, 
together with the fact that Mr. Anderson had been dealing at all times with Mr. 
Paynter, who held himself out to Mr. Anderson as having the authority to contract 
with him, suggest that extrinsic evidence surrounding the documents must be 
considered to determine the intent of the parties. 
The district court found the fact that Mr. Anderson signed the 
Acknowledgement Form to be dispositive of all his causes of action. Other facts 
that the court did not consider, however, support Mr. Anderson's other causes of 
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action, such that it was inappropriate to dismiss all of his claims based upon his 
signature on the Acknowledgement Form. For instance, when Mr. Anderson 
started to sign the Employment Agreement Mr. Paynter gave him in January 2008, 
Mr. Paynter stopped him and assured him that it was binding without signatures. 
This supports Mr. Anderson's claim of Fraud, assuming that LHMCC intended that 
it would not honor agreements that were not signed by all parties. Finally, Mr. 
Anderson relied on receiving the contract in informing his school that he would 
begin teaching part-time. Thus, these facts support Mr. Anderson's Promissory 
Estoppel claim. Finally, Mr. Anderson's claims for Breach of the Covenant of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing exist independently of any Breach of Contract claim. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT, AS A 
MATTER OF LAW, MR. PAYNTER DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO 
CONTRACT WITH MR. ANDERSON 
The district court erred in finding that as a matter of law, Mr. Paynter had no 
authority to act on LHMCC's behalf to contract with Mr. Anderson. 
In Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Appellees' arguments were 
primarily based upon their claim that Mr. Paynter did not have the actual authority 
to contract on behalf of LHMCC (only Larry H. Miller did) and that any contract 
between Mr. Anderson and LHMCC had to be in writing. R. 65-69. Appellees 
argued that Mr. Anderson knew this because he signed the Acknowledgement 
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form, which indicated that only Larry H. Miller had the authority to contract on 
behalf of the company. R. 65-68. 
Appellees' arguments on this point are incorrect for several reasons. First, 
Appellees' position that the Court must not look further than Mr. Anderson's 
signature on the Acknowledgement is contrary to the approach adopted by Utah for 
interpretation of contracts. "Utah case law has rejected the strict application of the 
'four corners' rule" and finds that "the better-reasoned approach is to consider the 
writing in light of the surrounding circumstances." Gillmor v. Macey, 2005 UT 
App. 351 (Utah App. 2005) at fn. 14 (internal cites omitted). In order to determine 
intent, the fact-finder may look at extrinsic evidence. Id. at % 38. Given the 
extrinsic evidence regarding Mr. Paynter's role in hiring, managing, and firing the 
KJZZ anchors (and the lack of involvement of any other LHMCC representative in 
the process), the written documents at issue in this case are not determinative of 
authority to contract here, and there is substantial evidence to go to a jury as to 
whether Mr. Paynter had actual and/or apparent authority to contract on behalf of 
LHMCC. 
Appellants will likely argue in response to this point that the court must not 
consider extrinsic evidence when the intent of the parties is clear. See R. 213. In 
this case, however, it cannot be said that the intent of the parties is clear based 
solely on the Acknowledgement form. While it is true that the Acknowledgement 
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states that only Larry H. Miller could enter into a contract with an employee, the 
handbook that the Acknowledgement was referring to was in direct conflict with 
this statement, providing that only the General Manager could enter into a contract 
with the employee. Because the provisions are contradictory on their face, and 
therefore ambiguous, this creates a question of intent that must be determined by 
the fact-finder. Gillmor v. Macey, 2005 UT App. 351, U 10, 38 (Utah App. 2005). 
"Only when contract terms are complete, clear, and unambiguous can they be 
interpreted by the judge on a motion for summary judgment." Colonial Leasing 
Co. of New England v. Larsen Bros. Constr. Co., 731 P.2d 483,488 (Utah 1986). 
In other words, in a case such as this, where the terms are unclear, the 
determination of the intent of the parties must be determined by a jury. 
It is also important to the question of intent that LHMCC's practices 
contradict both written provisions, because even setting aside the written 
Employment Agreement for the purposes of this discussion, Mr. Paynter clearly 
entered into an unwritten employment agreement with Mr. Anderson and the other 
anchors without the personal involvement of any other representative of LHMCC; 
he offered them the job and informed them of their salaries, and they accepted by 
coming to work at KJZZ. Thus, a fact-finder could determine that LHMCC did 
not intend to be bound by any written statement that only Mr. Miller or the General 
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Manager could contract on behalf of the company or that such an agreement must 
be in writing. 
A fact-finder could also find that under this set of facts, Mr. Paynter had 
actual or apparent authority to act on behalf of the Company, even if his authority 
was not expressly stated anywhere. It is clear under Utah law that an employer can 
be liable for the acts of its agent acting with apparent authority, even if that 
authority is not express. "Where corporate liability is sought for acts of its agent 
under apparent authority, liability is premised upon the corporation's knowledge of 
and acquiescence in the conduct of its agent which has led third parties to rely 
upon the agentfs actions." Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 
1090, 1094-95 (Utah 1988). "Apparent authority exists: v where a person has 
created such an appearance of things that it causes a third party reasonably and 
prudently to believe that a second party has the power to act on behalf of the first 
person.1" Id. at fn 24. This principle is certainly applicable in a situation like this 
where Mr. Anderson relied upon the promises of the only person he interfaced with 
about his employment with LHMCC. The fact that Mr. Paynter received the 
contract he provided to Mr. Anderson from LHMCC's lawyers, rather than drafting 
it himself, indicates that the company had knowledge of and acquiesced to the fact 
that he was entering into contracts with its employees, giving him actual and 
apparent authority to bind the company. 
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There is Utah case law directly on point here. The Utah Supreme Court has 
determined that when a representative of a company holds himself out as someone 
who can bind the company, even with a written statement to the contrary, there 
exists a material issue of fact as to whether that person has the authority to contract 
on behalf of the company. Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird Corporation, 16 P. 3d 555, 
560 (Utah 2000). In Shattuck-Owen, the plaintiff-employee was provided an 
employee handbook that stated that only the CEO/Chairman of the company could 
enter into an employment agreement. Id. at 560. Nonetheless, the Human 
Resources Director of the employer told the plaintiff that the company would pay 
for her therapy bills. Id.at 557. The Court considered the fact that the HR Director 
was the person in charge of explaining the benefits to the employee, and arranging 
for them. Furthermore, the employer "permitted [the HR Director] to act as the 
company representative in attempting to address Shattuck-Owen's therapy needs. 
At the very least, these facts raise a question as to Roberts's implied and/or 
apparent authority to act for Snowbird with respect to an employee benefits issue." 
Id. at 560, citing Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 
1094-95 (Utah 1988). The Court in Shattuck-Owen reversed the trial court's 
decision dismissing the claims on summary judgment. 
This case is very similar to the situation in Shattuck-Owen. In both cases, 
the company wrote down and had its employees sign a document stating that there 
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was only one way to get a contract, through a certain individual(s) and in writing. 
In both cases, the company then was continually represented by a different person 
who addressed the concerns and needs of the employee with respect to the terms of 
his employment. Just as in Shattuck-Owen, Mr. Paynter was the only person who 
communicated with Mr. Anderson about the terms of his employment and was the 
only person to respond to his request for a three-year contract. Thus, under Utah 
law, Mr. Paynter's conduct, and LHMCC's acquiescence to that conduct, raises an 
issue of fact as to any actual or apparent authority possessed by Mr. Paynter, which 
must be decided by a jury. 
In Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Appellees argued that any 
promises Mr. Paynter made to Mr. Anderson "concerning the terms of his 
employment, even if made, and even if they rose to the level of a contract, were 
revoked by Plaintiffs subsequent acceptance of employment on the[] terms" 
included in the Acknowledgement. R. 65. It is crucial to this analysis, however, 
that Mr. Paynter provided Mr. Anderson with the Employment Agreement they 
had been discussing after Mr. Anderson signed the Acknowledgement, and 
simultaneously represented to him that the Employment Agreement was valid 
without being signed. Accordingly, Mr. Paynter's agreement with Mr. Anderson 
superseded any other binding agreement he may have entered into with LHMCC. 
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Finally, taking the Acknowledgement at its face value, the document in and 
of itself is not binding because there is no evidence that Larry H. Miller was a 
party to it. 
H. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE FACT THAT 
MR. ANDERSON SIGNED THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT FORM TO BE 
DISPOSITIVE OF ALL MR. ANDERSON'S CLAIMS 
Based upon its finding that Mr. Anderson "was aware or should have been 
aware by November 28, 2007, that any promise made by Defendant Dean Paynter 
was not binding," the district court dismissed all of Mr. Anderson's claims. R. 
241. The court found that the fact that Mr. Anderson signed the 
Acknowledgement, which provided that only Larry H. Miller could bind the 
company in an agreement with him and that such agreement had to be in writing, 
meant that not only did Mr. Anderson not have an enforceable agreement with Mr. 
Paynter, but he could not have reasonably believed that Mr. Paynter could enter 
into an agreement with him. 
A. Breach of Contract Claims 
The court also found that Mr. Anderson's Breach of Contract claim failed 
because Larry H. Miller did not make a contract with him, and that his claim for 
Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing failed because "this 
implied covenant only applies to existing contract terms, does not create new 
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independent rights not agreed upon by the parties, and the undisputed facts 
establish that the contract Plaintiff asserts did not exist." R. 244-245. 
As set forth above, Mr. Anderson argues that Mr. Paynter did enter into an 
enforceable agreement with him. Additionally, even without such an agreement, 
there existed a convenant of good faith and fair dealing between the parties 
because they were in an employer-employee relationship. In Utah, "a covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing inheres in most, if not all, contractual relationships." 
St. Benedict's Dev. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P. 2d 194,199 (Utah 1991). 
Employment relationships, of course, are contractual relationships, whether or not 
the agreement is in writing. "Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
each party impliedly promises that he will not intentionally or purposely do 
anything which will destroy or injure the other party's right to receive the fruits of 
the contract." Id. This promise is independent of the express terms of any contract 
between the parties. Id. at 200. Since it is clear here that Mr. Anderson and 
LHMCC had an employment relationship, even if the terms of that relationship are 
in dispute, the parties were bound by the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Whether LHMCC violated that covenant is for a jury to determine. 
B. Fraud and Promissory Estoppel 
The district court found that Mr. Anderson could not have reasonably relied 
upon Mr. Paynter's representations to him, and since reasonable reliance is an 
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element of both Fraud and Promissory Estoppel, the court found that those claims 
failed as well. Utah case law is clear, however, that a determination regarding 
reasonable reliance is not appropriate for summary judgment. "Reasonable 
reliance must be considered with reference to the facts of each case, and is usually 
a question for the jury to determine." Conder v. Al Williams & Associates, 739 P. 
2d 634, 638 (Utah App. 1987). This Court has previously found, for instance, that 
a plaintiffs reliance on verbal assurances may be reasonable even when he has 
signed a written agreement to the contrary. Id. 
Mr. Anderson made clear in this case that he repeatedly asked for a contract 
from Mr. Paynter, and did not inform his school that he would go part-time until he 
had the contract in hand, and that he believed it was valid because of Mr. Paynter's 
assurances. In light of the facts in this case, the question of whether Mr. Anderson 
reasonably relied upon Mr. Paynter's assurances that he would receive a salary for 
three years even if he was terminated should be a question of fact for a jury to 
determine, not dismissed as a matter of law. 
Regarding Mr. Anderson's Fraud claim, it is important that Mr. Paynter 
states that he did not believe that the Employment Contract he gave Mr. Anderson 
would be binding without signatures, and yet, Mr. Anderson alleges that Mr. 
Paynter represented to him the opposite - that the document was binding without 
signatures. If a jury believes Mr. Anderson, it could find that Mr. Paynter's 
28 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
assurances were simply an attempt to rely on his assurances and not sign the 
document, so that he could later claim it was not valid, which supports Mr. 
Anderson's claim of Fraud. 
In Defendants' Reply Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Defendants/Appellees claimed that Mr. Anderson did not respond to 
Defendants' arguments that they were entitled to summary judgment on his 
Promissory Estoppel and Fraud claims, and therefore, they should be granted 
summary judgment on those claims. R. 217. The district court did not address this 
claim by Defendants in its ruling. 
This argument by Defendants/Appellees is incorrect for two reasons. First, 
Mr. Anderson did respond to Defendants' arguments regarding his Fraud and 
Promissory Estoppel claims. Defendants claimed in their Motion for Summary 
Judgment that Mr. Anderson's Promissory Estoppel claim should be dismissed 
"because 1) given the contract disclaimer he signed, the Company could not be 
bound by any representation of a three year employment contract or guaranteed 
salary by Mr. Paynter, and 2) Plaintiff could not have reasonably relied upon any 
representation to this effect by Mr. Paynter." R. 69. Defendants made essentially 
the same arguments with respect to Mr. Anderson's Fraud claim. R. 71. In effect, 
Defendants argued that both claims should be dismissed because Mr. Anderson 
could not have reasonably relied on Mr. Paynter's representations to him because 
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of the contract disclaimer he signed. Mr. Anderson focused his response to 
summary judgment on his position that whether Mr. Paynter had the authority to 
contract with him (and by extension, whether he reasonably relied upon Mr. 
Paynter's representations to him) is a question of fact. R. 168-172. Mr. 
Anderson's arguments and the relevant case law establish that, indeed, Mr. 
Paynter's authority is a question of fact. Accordingly, Defendants did not meet 
their burden to "affirmatively provide factual evidence establishing that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact," such that they are entitled to summary judgment as 
a matter of law. Orvis v. Johnson, 111 P. 3d 600, 604 (Utah 2008). 
m . THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING A HEARING 
ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(e) provides, "The court shall grant a request for a hearing 
on a motion under Rule 56 . . . unless the court finds that the motion or opposition 
to the motion is frivolous or the issue has been authoritatively decided." 
Defendants' Request to Submit Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
for Decision included a request for a hearing. R. 236. The district court was 
required to grant Defendants' request for a hearing, unless it found either party's 
position to be frivolous or that the issue had been authoritatively decided. Price v. 
Amour, 949 P. 2d 1251,1255 (Utah 1997) (relying on Utah Code of Judicial 
Admin. Rule 4-501(3), which has since been repealed; however, Utah R. Civ. P. 
7(e) has been adopted, which contains the same language). Unless one of these 
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exceptions applies, a trial court errs in not holding a hearing, regardless of which 
party requests the hearing. Id. This error compels "reversal of the trial court's 
substantive ruling" if not holding the hearing was prejudicial. Id. 
Here, if the court had held a hearing, Mr. Anderson could have pointed out 
the factual issues and legal precedent that the court was overlooking in analyzing 
the case as set forth herein. Accordingly, the court's failure to hold a hearing was 
prejudicial, and constitutes reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the district court erred in dismissing all of Mr. 
Anderson's claims on summary judgment. Mr. Anderson hereby requests that this 
Court reverse the district court's ruling on all of his claims, and remand the case 
for a trial on the merits. 
DATED this 17th day of May, 2011. 
HOLLINGSWORTH LAW OFFICE, LLC 
April L. Hollingsworth 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the / / d a y of May, 2011, a copy of the foregoing 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF was mailed first class, postage prepaid to: 
Janet Hugie Smith 
Michael E. Blue 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385 
April L. Holling&worth 
ADDENDUM 
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Exhibit A ~ Minute Entry of district court granting Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Exhibit B — Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Dismissing Plaintiffs Entire Action With Prejudice, drafted by Defendants and 
signed by the district court 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 




LARRY H. MILLER COMMUNICATIONS 
CORPORATION, a corporation, and 
DEAN PAYNTER, CHRIS BAUM, and 
JOHN DOE, individually, 
Defendants. ! 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 090909953 
Judge: L.A DEVER 
The above entitled matter is before the Court on Defendants', Larry H. Miller 
Communications Corporation and Dean Paynter ("Defendants"), Request to Submit for 
Decision their Motion for Summary Judgment, filed July 28, 2010. Having reviewed 
Defendants' Motion and Plaintiffs Opposition thereto, and being duly advised in the 
premises of each, the Court makes the following ruling. 
Plaintiffs Complaint stems from an alleged breach of contract of an employment 
agreement. Specifically, Plaintiff maintains that Defendants promised to pay Plaintiff the 
full term of his three-year contract if he was terminated without cause. (CompL nos. 17-
31). 
Defendants assert that Defendant Dean Paynter did not have the authority to 
bind the Larry H. Miller Communications Corporation with any alleged verbal promises 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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and that Plaintiff was aware of this. Defendants reference in relevant part, the 
Acknowledgment of Employee Handbook and At-Will Employment form ("Form") signed 
by Plaintiff, dated November 28, 2007. The Form provides in part: 
I also understand and agree that no person other than Larry H. 
Miller has the authority to enter into any binding commitment or agreement 
to or with me, on behalf of the Company, and that any such commitment 
or agreement must be in writing and signed by all parties. 
(Defs1 Mem. In Supp. Ex C). 
Case law is clear in contract interpretation. The Utah Supreme Court explained: 
When interpreting a contract, a court first looks to the contract's 
four corners to determine the parties1 intentions, which are controlling. If 
the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, then 
a court does not resort to extrinsic evidence of the contract's meaning, 
and a court determines the parties' intentions from the plain meaning of 
the contractual language as a matter of law. 
Bakowski v. Mt. States Steel, Inc.. 2002 UT 62,1J16, 52 P.3d 1179 (citations omitted). 
The Form unambiguously provided to Plaintiff that (1) he was an at-will 
employee, (2) Larry H. Miller was the only party that had authority to enter into a binding 
agreement on behalf of Defendant Larry H. Miller Communications Corporation 
("LHMCC"), and (3) that any commitment or agreement had to be in writing and signed 
by all parties. 
This is directly counter to Plaintiffs claim that "he did [not] read anything that 
suggested to him that the three-year contract he had just been given was not valid." 
2 
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(Compl. no. 20). 
Plaintiff began working for LHMCC on or about November 26, 2007. As noted, 
Plaintiff signed the Form November 28, 2007, approximately two days later. The Court 
notes that it was not until December 2007, that Plaintiff informed the school that he was 
intending to work for LHMCC and that he would be working part-time at the school. The 
actual reduction started in January 2008. Id. at no. 21. 
Plaintiff was aware or should have been aware by November 28, 2007, that any 
promise made by Defendant Dean Paynter was not binding. See generally Smith v. 
Price's Creameries, 650 P.2d 825, 829 (N.M. 1982) ("Each party to a contract has a 
duty to read and familiarize himself with its contents before he signs and delivers it [.]") 
Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
Defendants are to prepare an ORDER for the Court consistent with the reasons 
described within their Memorandum In Support. 
Dated 27th day of September, 2010. 
BY THE COURT: 
L.A. DEVER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry dated 
<-"~0 
this ^TV ! day of September, 2010, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Janet Hugie smith 
Michael E. Blue 
Ray Quinney & Nebeker, PC 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
April L. Hollingsworth 
Hollingsworth Law Office, LLC 
115 South 900 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
CLERK OF COURT y 
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JANET HUGIE SMITH (3001) 
MICHAEL E. BLUE (5258) 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801)532-1500 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




LARRY H. MILLER COMMUNICATIONS 
CORPORATION, a corporation; and DEAN 
PAYNTER, CHRIS BAUM, and JOHN DOE, 
individually, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFF'S ENTIRE ACTION WITH 
PREJUDICE 
Civil No. 090909953 
Judge Dever 
Having reviewed and considered the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
memoranda in support and Plaintiff's opposition thereto, the Court hereby ORDERS that 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and that Plaintiffs entire action, 
including the Complaint and all causes of action alleged therein, is dismissed with prejudice, on 
the grounds that there are no issues of material fact and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law, for the reasons stated in the Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
^SS&owr 
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Summary Judgment and Reply Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
including the following: 
1. Plaintiffs First Cause of Action for Breach of Contract fails because the 
undisputed facts establish that 1) Plaintiff was an at-will employee; 2) only Larry H. Miller had 
the authority to bind the Larry H. Miller Communications Corporation ("LHMCC") to the 
employment contract alleged by Plaintiff; 3) Dean Paynter, the person Plaintiff alleges made this 
agreement on behalf of LHMCC, did not have the authority to do so; 4) any such contract had to 
be in writing and signed by all parties; and 5) Mr. Miller never made any contract with Plaintiff 
and there was no signed, written contract. 
2. Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action for Promissory Estoppel fails as a matter of 
law because Plaintiff could not have reasonably relied upon the alleged promise made by Dean 
Paynter for a guaranteed three-year contract, given the express statement he signed which 
unambiguously informed him that 1) he was an at-will employee; 2) only Larry H. Miller could 
bind the company to any such promise; and 3) any such promise had to be in a writing signed by 
all parties to be enforceable. 
3. Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action for Fraud fails as a matter of law because it is 
undisputed that 1) the company as an entity never made any of the alleged representations to 
Plaintiff; and 2) Plaintiff did not reasonably rely upon the alleged representations by Dean 
Paynter for the reasons stated in paragraph 2, above. 
2 
, , / 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4. Plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing fails as a matter of law because this implied covenant only applies to 
existing contract terms, does not create new independent rights not agreed upon by the parties, 
and the undisputed facts establish that the contract Plaintiff asserts did not exist. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Clerk of the Court is hereby directed to immediately enter 
Judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff, dismissing Plaintiffs entire action in its 
entirety, with prejudice, both sides to bear their own costs and attorneys fees. 
DATED this ^ day of l ^ C W 2010. 
BY THE COURT: 
HftNORABLETrXreEVER 
DISTRIGTODURT JUDGE ^ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
C_ 
April L. Hollingsworth 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of October, 2010, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing [proposed] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT was served via United States Mail, first-class postage prepaid, on the following: 
April L. Hollingsworth 
Hollingsworth Law Office, LLC 
1115 South 900 East 
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